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MODERN CRITIQUES OF JUDICIAL EMPATHY:
A REVISED INTELLECTUAL HISTORY
Brenner Fissell
2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 817
ABSTRACT

The role of "empathy" haunts recent debates about how judges
make decisions. Remarkably, however, the intellectual origins of
scholarly resistance to empathicjudging remain poorly understood.
This Article fills that gap. Through historicaland theoreticalstudy, it
reveals the ways in which the modern anti-emphatic consensus can
be seen as a mutated descendent of late-nineteenth century
formalism. This Article also marks an irony with significant
implications for the empathy debate: Although the anti-empathic
view was born offormalism, it has driftedfrom its source such that it
would almost certainly be condemned by the very formalist scholars
from whom it is descended. Modern critiques of judicial empathy
liberate themselves from an important limitation imposed by those
prior theories-they believe that their proposed methods can be
applicable beyond the realm ofprivate law, and into public law-but
if this is impossible, then these theories have nothing to say about the
area in which they are so often employed: constitutional
interpretation.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Supreme Court confirmation hearings have sparked a renewed
interest in the "proper role" of a judge and of adjudication generally.
The topic took on an exaggerated place in the Roberts and
Sotomayor hearings, and is likely to be center stage in those coming
up in the near future.' While this debate has always pervaded both
public and theoretical discussions, many have noticed that recent
instantiations seem skewed in favor of one side-one vision of
adjudication has emerged as appropriate and acceptable, with its
purported opposite disfavored and maligned by all but liberal legal
academics. The publicly acceptable view is that of a judge who uses
reason alone to reach a decision, and who plays by the established
rules (which are themselves easy to discern). The alternative, now
seemingly anathema, is the judge who supplements reason with
experience and affective (i.e., non-cognitive, emotional) capacitiesespecially empathy. This new climate of opinion has been called "the
2
anti-empathic tum."

In response, recent scholarship seeks to situate this shift within
the larger trends that have taken place in legal theory over the past
century. Specifically, Robin West argues that the anti-empathic turn
is the intellectual progeny of an element of thinking advanced by the
"Legal Realists":
The paradigm shift I'll describe represents a culmination, or vindication,
of Justice Holmes's audacious claim ... near the beginning of the century
just closed, that the common-law lawyer and common-law judge of the
future-that would be us, now-would be the masters of economics,

1.
MINN.

See generally Thomas B. Colby, In Defense of Judicial Empathy, 96

L. REV. 1944 (2012).
2.

Robin West, The Anti-Empathic Turn, in NOMOS LIII: PASSIONS AND

EMOTIONS 243-88 (James E. Fleming ed., 2013).
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statistics, and the slide rule, rather than the masters of Blackstone or black3
letter law.

Adjudication based on social science was objective, replacing
the moralizing of prior theories-this, of course, leaves no room for
empathy or any similarly "subjective" considerations. As West
writes,
[I]t's worth identifying just three of the "signposts along the road"
originating either in law or sister disciplines. The first was a development
in American legal theory ....
In the first three decades of the past century, "legal realists" famously
rebelled against the then traditional paradigm of moralistic judging, as
well as the "brooding omnipresence in the sky" that informed it, by which
they meant the common law in general and Langdellian pretenses of the
4
common law's autonomy and "completeness" in particular.

Investigating the intellectual genealogy of the anti-empathic
consensus is a useful endeavor, and helps us to better understand its
theoretical foundations. Still, we should look back further than Legal
Realism if we want to see the ultimate progenitor of the anti-empathy
theory-back to what we now call classical legal orthodoxy. West
points us to the movement that rebelled against this "Langdellian"
orthodoxy, but it is the orthodoxy itself that provides a firmer basis
for comparison. Because both Langdellianism and the anti-empathic
consensus posit that the law is complete, determinate, autonomous,
apolitical, and derivable and applicable through formal reason, it is
accurate to describe the anti-empathic consensus as neo-orthodox
legal thought. However, this neo-orthodoxy abandons or ignores an
important limitation of its ancestor: It aspires to be applicable to the
realm of public law, an area where Langdell and his followers
thought that scientific adjudication was impossible. Thus, the
genealogy must be supplemented, but admittedly, this
supplementation cannot account for everything.
Part II will briefly describe the debate about judicial empathy,
with Part III laying out the reconstructed (and supplemented)
argument against it. Part IV will do the same with classical legal
orthodoxy, and Part V will compare and contrast the two intellectual
movements. Overall, I conclude that the anti-empathy position is best
described as neo-orthodoxy, but that its salient difference-the focus
on public law-makes it a mutation that would be unrecognizable
and unacceptable to the older orthodox theory. Because the debate
3.
4.

Id at 249.
Id at 274.
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about the role of empathy in adjudication is likely to resurface very
soon in the impending confirmation hearings of any new Supreme
Court justice, we would do well to recall the intellectual progenitors
of each opposing camp, and take note of long recognized weaknesses
(or strengths) in any older theories. To understand the debate, we
should understand its context.
II. BACKGROUND & CLARIFICATION

Because there has been a great deal written on the judicial
empathy debate, I will not revisit its history in great detail. Suffice it
to say, statements made by President Obama regarding Supreme
Court nominations led to the issue of "empathy" taking on symbolic
importance during confirmation hearings, with nominees espousing
views of proper adjudication and the public weighing in.' However,
what emerged in response was somewhat of a consensus: The judges
themselves, the senators, and the public all turned against empathic
judging, and looked instead towards the "umpire" model advanced
by Chief Justice Roberts.6 Various intellectuals also engaged in the
debate, siding with this popular consensus. These groups defined
empathy as an emotional connection with certain types of people or
ideas; it was what others call "sympathy" or "selective empathy." 7
In response, the legal academy developed its own, but opposite
consensus: Empathic judging is neither deleterious nor is it some
new "liberal" innovation. Instead, the nature of adjudication makes it
such that empathy is both necessary and salutary (for various
reasons),' and empathy properly understood is an affective faculty
5. For an excellent summary of the entire saga, see Colby, supranote 1, at
1945-58.
6. Id. at 1947-49.
7.
See John Hasnas, The 'Unseen' Deserve Empathy, Too, WALL ST. J.,
May 29, 2009, at Al5. The terms "selective empathy" and "sympathy" are usually
employed by pro-empathy thinkers hoping to differentiate their claims from these
other concepts (that are the source of Hasnas's worries). See, e.g., West, supra note
2, at 248-49.
8. Although articles like this proliferate, the most notable and rigorous are
the following: Susan A. Bandes, Moral Imagination in Judging, 51 WASHBURN L.J.
1 (2011); Susan A. Bandes, Empathetic Judging and the Rule of Law, 2009
CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 133 (2009); Colby, supra note 1; Lynne N. Henderson,
Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574 (1987); West, supra note 2. These
thinkers show (persuasively) that many legal doctrines clearly require that the
adjudicator imagine what the litigant's position must be like, and that this produces
more just outcomes. Empathic adjudication is thus descriptively true as an account
of the type of adjudication that the law demands, but is also normatively valuable.
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that enables one to better understand any other person, idea, or
position.' Thus, this faculty is not spring-loaded in favor of any one
litigant, but is neutral. One influential formulation of this type of
empathy-and the definition that will be applied throughout this
paper-is put forward by Lynne Henderson: Empathy is
"understanding the experience or situation of another, both
affectively and cognitively, often achieved by imagining oneself to
be in the position of the other."
Comparing this avowedly neutral definition with the
"sympathy" conception utilized by empathy-detractors, we might
think that this entire debate is but a definitional misunderstanding.
Some have suggested this," but I find that this too easily dodges the
central question at issue. Even if we take the broader, more neutral
definition of empathy, the anti-empathic thinkers discussed below
would still reject it. For them, proper adjudication cannot admit of
any affective influences, even when acting as supplements or
complements to the cognitive faculties, and even when purportedly
neutral. For the anti-empathic thinkers, the affective-the
emotional-inherently skews decision-making. For them, neutral,
nonselective empathy is impossible. Because of this, we cannot so
easily escape the dichotomy posed by the debate; it must be
confronted head on, as a fundamental disagreement about the
legitimacy of utilizing affective faculties in adjudication.
III. THE ANTI-EMPATHY ARGUMENT

I will begin by constructing and supplementing the argument
against judicial empathy. In doing so, I draw on a variety of sources.
These include opinion pieces from prominent thinkers, as well as
some law review articles and older books. While it may be that those
who oppose empathy do not have one monolithic view, there is
generally a strong similarity, and an amalgamation will be
substantially faithful to each individual. It is helpful to state up front
the conclusion that will eventually be reached by this explication:
Adjudication ought only involve the application of cognitive
faculties (especially reason, logic, etc.), and the implementation of
affective faculties in the endeavor is illicit. How does one arrive
here? As we will see, the conclusion flows from higher order
9.
10.
11.

See generallyHasnas, supra note 7.
Henderson, supranote 8, at 1579.
See, e.g., Bandes, Empathetic Judging and the Rule ofLaw, supra note 8.
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commitments about the function of law (and politics), as well as the
"rule of law" and the advantages it is expected to bring.
A. Law and Politics
The anti-empathic turn begins with the notion that the function
or point of law itself is social stability, settlement, and predictability.
The idea goes something like this: Without authority (and its
instrument or manifestation, law) cooperative living is impossible.
We need predetermined rules so that we can coordinate our actions,
settle on certain basic terms or arrangements, and minimize the costs
of nonlegal forms of social ordering.
This deeper justification is most fully addressed in antiempathic thinking by Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson.1 2 "[Law] aims to
avoid and to settle disagreements through pre-determined
procedures. At its most basic level," Wilkinson observes, "law is
supposed to provide stability and predictability to society."13
Elsewhere he says that law is "society's roadmap for resolving
disputes," and that it "establish[es] . . . rules of the game."1 4 In saying
this, this theory echoes themes running throughout the Legal Process
school and branches of contemporary analytic jurisprudence."
After staking out a claim regarding the function of law, the next
step is invariably an invocation of the need for the "rule of law." If
law is instituted so as to provide a stable and predictable framework
for social life, then the authority that creates and promulgates the law
must itself abide by certain procedural limitations or requirements.
Otherwise, the "function" of law would be negated by the manner in
which it is drawn up or implemented. Philosophers of law agree that
the rule of law consists of a constellation of ideal process
characteristics that all legal codes should strive to attain-these are

12. See generally J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Subjective Art; Objective Law,
85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1663 (2010).
13. Id. at 1682.
14. Id. at 1683; see also id. ("Law is intended to set the standards by which
people behave, business is conducted, and disputes are resolved.").
15. See, e.g., JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980)
(representing analytic natural law's account of law as solution to coordination
problems); HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (2001) (representing legal
process view of law as dispute settler); SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY (2011)
(representing analytic positivism's account of law as social planner).
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best understood as limitations upon the State. 6 Fuller famously lists
these "desiderata" as eight: generality, publicity, clarity, consistency,
feasibility, constancy, prospectivity, and congruence (between de
jure and defacto)." Matthew Kramer fleshes them out helpfully:
1. [Law] operates through general norms;
2. its norms are promulgated to the people whose conduct is to be
authoritatively assessed by reference to them;
3. its norms are prospective rather than retrospective;
4. the authoritative formulations of its norms are understandable (at least
by people with juristic expertise) rather than opaquely unintelligible;
5. its norms are logically consistent with one another, and the obligations
imposed by those norms can be jointly fulfilled;
6. its norms do not require things that are starkly beyond the capabilities of
the people who are subject to the norms;
7. the contents of its norms, instead of being transformed sweepingly and
very frequently, remain mostly unchanged for periods of time long enough
to induce familiarity; and
8. its norms are generally effectuated in accordance with what they
prescribe, so that the formulations of the norms (the laws on the books) are
congruent with the ways in which they are implemented (the laws in
practice).

These desiderata are expected to aid in the maximization of
law's coordinating function-they help set up a stable and
predictable framework for social life.'9 In the end, they are also
supposed to advance the higher order value of freedom.2 0
16. Finnis writes that the rule of law is the "name commonly given to the
state of affairs in which a legal system is legally in good shape." FINNIS, supra note
15, at 270. Raz helps to clarify the object of this "rule": While it is certainly true that
the plain meaning of "rule of law" suggests that it concerns itself with individual
conduct, "in political and legal theory it has come to be read in a narrower sense,
that the government shall be ruled by the law and subject to it." JOSEPH RAZ, THE
AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 212 (1979). What we are
talking about, then, is some sort of desirable manner in which the creation and
application of law is undertaken. Id. at 213 ("As we shall see, what the doctrine
requires is the subjection of particular laws to general, open, and stable ones. It is
one of the important principles of the doctrine that the making of particularlaws
should be guided by open andrelatively stable general rules.").
17. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 38-39 (rev. ed. 1969).
18.
MATTHEW H. KRAMER, OBJECTIVITY AND THE RULE OF LAW 104 (2007).
19. RAZ, supra note 16, at 214-15.
20. Id. at 220-21; FINNIS, supra note 15, at 273 ("The fundamental point of
the desiderata is to secure to the subjects of authority the dignity of self-direction

and freedom from certain forms of manipulation.");

FRIEDRICH

A.

HAYEK, THE
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The phrase "rule of law" occurs quite frequently in the antiempathy writings, and it is usually linked with freedom. For
example, a prominent opinion piece written by Professor Steven
Calabresi ends ominously: "Nothing less than the very idea of liberty
and the rule of law are at stake in this election. We should not let Mr.
Obama replace justice with empathy in our nation's courtrooms."21
Similarly, in Herbert Wechsler's famous article on "neutral
principles," he quotes approvingly from Justice Jackson's The
Supreme Court in the American System of Government: "Liberty is
not the mere absence of restraint, it is not a spontaneous product of
majority rule . . .. It is achieved only by a rule of law." 2 2
Working within the parameters set down by the rule of law, it
is expected that representative democracy (which is itself valuable)
will flourish precisely because of those limits. Law facilitates politics
and ensures its survival, while politics beneficially softens the
rigidity of law. Wilkinson writes, "Diversity of experience comes
from aggregating people's backgrounds democratically," 23 and
"America does not need jurists of a modem cast of mind to be a
modem nation. The great tides of democratic change will see to
that." 2 4 Edward Whelan, too, believes that any constitutional theory
should aim at "protecting the democratic decisionmaking authority
that the Constitution provides." 25 While "[o]ur legislators will be sure
to mess up plenty . . . at least citizens will have the ability to
influence them-and replace them." 2 6 Robert Bork, too, argues that
the choice between a judicial oligarchy and an omnipotent
democracy is a "false statement of alternatives" and that proper

ROAD TO SERFDOM 72 (1944) ("Stripped of all technicalities, this means that

government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced beforehandrules which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use
its coercive powers in given circumstances and to plan one's individual affairs on
the basis of this knowledge.").
21.
Steven G. Calabresi, Obama's 'Redistribution'Constitution, WALL ST.
J. (Oct. 28, 2008), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122515067227674187 [https://
perma.cc/8M79-98SN].
22. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law,

73

HARV. L. REV. 1, 16 (1959) (quoting J. ROBERT
COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 76

23.
24.
25.

H. JACKSON,
(1955)).

THE SUPREME

Wilkinson, supra note 12, at 1679.
Id. at 1685.
Edward Whelan, Obama's Constitution: The Rhetoric and the Reality,

THE WEEKLY STANDARD

(Mar. 17, 2008), http://www.weeklystandard.com/print/

obamas-constitution/article/15945 [https://perma.cc/8LJG-QA2H].
26. Id.
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constitutional theory can allow for judicially enforced legal
limitations to coexist with a representative system.27
While law and politics seem to exist in mutualistic symbiosis,
this symbiosis paradoxically demands complete separation. Only by
isolating law from politics are both able to survive without one
subsuming the other. This antinomy is a constant refrain of the antiempathic turn. Wechsler presents them in the starkest contrast: "Is
there not, in short, a vital difference between legislative freedom to
appraise the gains and losses in projected measures and the kind of
principled appraisal, in respect of values that can reasonably be
asserted to have constitutional dimension, that alone is in the
province of the courts?" 28 Principles are "instrumental" tools in
politics, and Wechsler accepts this as a reality. 29 However, he
demands that at least in law, principles are intrinsic features.3 0
"[P]rinciples," he writes, "are largely instrumental as they are
employed in politics, instrumental in relation to results that a
controlling sentiment demands at any given time," but courts must
decide in a manner that is "genuinely principled, resting with respect
to every step that is involved in reaching judgment on analysis and
reasons quite transcending the immediate result that is achieved." 3 1
Bork agrees, stating that "[t]he Court can act as a legal rather than a
political institution only if it is neutral," and that law, unlike politics,
"has a meaning independent of our own desires."3 2 A decidedly nonorthodox legal thinker, Roberto Unger, sums up the position best:
Doctrine can exist, according to the formalist view, because of a contrast
between the more determinate rationality of legal analysis and the less
determinate rationality of ideological contests.
This thesis can be restated as the belief that lawmaking, guided only by the
looser and more inconclusive arguments suited to ideological disputes,
33
differs fundamentally from law application.

Thus, from the standpoint of the judiciary in the context of a
representative democracy, authority and legitimacy are only granted
to the adjudicative endeavor when it is apolitical, or purely "legal."
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA:
160 (1990).
Wechsler, supranote 22, at 16.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 14-15.
BORK, supra note 27, at 143, 146.

33.

ROBERTO

ROBERT

THE POLITICAL

SEDUCTION OF THE LAW

MOVEMENT

2 (1986).

MANGABEIRA

UNGER,

THE

CRITICAL

LEGAL

STUDIES
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Judges are only authorized to act in a way that is not in some sense in
direct competition with democracy-in competition with politicsand this is accomplished by acting only in a logical and rational
manner. As Fiss writes, "[T]he authority of the judiciary is linked to
[its] substantive rationality." 3 4 Wilkinson agrees: "The judge is
imbued with authority precisely because he is not an aesthete, with
the idiosyncratic creativity and talent the term implies."35
B. Proper Adjudication
All of these higher order commitments of course have
implications for adjudication. If law has a function that necessitates
the procedural limits of the rule of law, then the judge must act in
such a way that these are not undermined or destroyed.
The element of the rule of law that is most concerned with
adjudication is congruence3 6-that which the legal source specifies
must actually be made to happen.3 7 "[T]hose people who have
authority to make, administer, and apply the rules in an official
capacity," Finnis states, "do actually administer the law consistently
and in accordance with its tenor." 38 Or, as Kramer writes, the "laws
on the books" must align with the "laws in practice," and if this
happens then identical cases will have identical results.3 9 Because the
law must also be general in applicability and constant over time,
though, congruence also results in uniformity. It is this uniformityaspect of congruence that is most central to the debate about
adjudication:4 0 The law "on the books" should be applied
34.

Owen M. Fiss, Reason in All Its Splendor, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 789, 791

(1990).
35.
Wilkinson, supra note 12, at 1684.
36.
Most of the desiderata involve legislatures. "Consistency" is not about
consistent application, but consistency or coherence within the code. "Constancy"
also applies mostly to legislatures, and would only be judicially implicated if a court
often changed the rules it created. "Congruence" more filly captures the essence of
the debate about uniform adjudication than do these two, as it deals with application.
37.
See KRAMER, supra note 18, at 104 ("[I]ts norms are generally
effectuated in accordance with what they prescribe, so that the formulations of the
norms (the laws on the books) are congruent with the ways in which they are
implemented (the laws in practice).").
38. FINNIs, supra note 15, at 270-71.
39. KRAMER, supra note 18, at 104.
40. Violations of congruence can take place in a variety of ways, but they
all have this same basic feature. First, it could be the case that a judiciary wholly
refuses to give effect to an authoritative norm, thus creating no uniformity problem
but nevertheless eliminating congruence. Beyond this, judges might apply the norm
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consistently across cases, litigants, time periods, and no matter who
the judicial officer is.4 1
Once it is posited that a requirement of the rule of law is
uniform adjudication across all axes, the process of adjudication
further
constrained.
Preliminarily,
even
before
becomes
"adjudication" begins, it becomes necessary to limit the sources to
which the judge can look-he must appeal only to those that are the
same for all people all of the time.42 There must be some fixed
source, and for the anti-empathic thinkers this is provided by
statutory, constitutional, or administrative text, supplemented by
judicial precedent.
Here we are at the stage of what Bork calls the "derivation" of
the principle or rule, and he insists that this must itself be "neutral."4 3
Derivation, then, must come from (1) the rule's text and (2) its
original public meaning. As Wilkinson writes, "A judge has no
sanction to decide other than what a particular text means and
whether it applies to the situation under consideration."' Bork
provides further elaboration: "[T]he meaning of a rule that judges
should not change . . . is the meaning understood at the time of the
law's enactment." 4 5 Judges are bound by fixed texts, and the meaning
of these texts is also fixed. Orin Kerr suggests that even in hard
cases, the solution is to "read more cases, or read the briefs again."46
Nothing beyond these specific legal sources can provide a ground for
a given outcome-appeals to sources of authority beyond text and
precedent are examples of what Bork calls illicit "political judging,"
where the judge "make[s] unguided value judgments."47
After deriving a law, a judge must interpret it and apply it. This
is where the judge must take the authoritative legal source and see
how it fits with the real world; facts of cases enter, and so too do the
qualities of individual litigants and issues. Anti-empathy thinkers are
at one time or another, but not always. Finally, we might imagine that there are
individual judges who themselves are the outliers. The first is a systemic congruence
problem, which is not at issue in the empathy judging debate.
41. KRAMER, supra note 18, at 104.
42. BORK, supra note 27, at 146.
43. Id.
44. Wilkinson, supra note 12, at 1680; see also id. at 1677 (describing "the
form and structure legal texts provide").
45. BORK, supra note 27, at 144.
46. Orin Kerr, Legal Ambiguity, Empathy, and the Role of JudicialPower,
THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 13, 2009), http://volokh.com/2009/05/13/legalambiguity-empathy-and-the-role-of-judicial-power/ [https://perma.cc/8U89-HJ92].
47. BORK, supra note 27, at 146.
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rationalists:They believe that legal sources must be interpreted and
applied solely using the cognitive faculties of logic and reason.4 8
Kerr alludes to this when he describes how "careful judicial
weighing" of the legally relevant sources will determine an
outcome, 9 as does Wechsler with his "emphasis upon the role of
reason."o Similarly, Wilkinson admonishes judges to look to
"reason" and "tradition," and "structure and logic."' This is what
Bork means when he demands "neutrality in the application" of law:
"[R]easoning and verbal formulations" determine results, and
adherence to this method is a matter of "intellectual integrity."5 2
Owen Fiss describes this as "Reason in All its Splendor":
Given its deliberate character, the judicial decision may be seen as the
paragon of all rational decisions ....
In calling this process rationalistic, I mean to underscore its discursive
nature: The justices listen to arguments . . . [and] evaluate the strengths
and weaknesses of the arguments. Thinking itself is an interiorization of
the discursive process, a continuation of the argument but now wholly
within the individual [judge].53

Formal reason and logic alone control the interpretation and
application.
The demand for rationalism follows from the underlying aim of
the larger theory-rationalism creates uniform and consistent
adjudication so as to advance the rule of law and law's stabilizing
function. Rational interpretation and application advance uniformity
because reason is assumed to be transitive across and amongst
individuals. Reason is the same for everyone, and produces the same
outcomes or reaches the same results no matter the individual
employing it. Reason is "objective" in this sense, and completely
"rational" judges would never disagree about anything. If
adjudication is purely rational, it is expected to be purely uniform.
The transitivity of rationality is, of course, an assumption, but it
is crucial to the anti-empathic argument. So too are other
assumptions. At the most basic level, it must be assumed that people
are rational more generally (i.e., that human beings are rational
beings). Furthermore, even if humans are rational and rationality is
48. Fiss, supra note 34, at 789-90.
49. Kerr, supra note 46.
50.
Wechsler, supra note 22, at 16. Of course, he also looks to "principles,"
but these are themselves rationally derived, no doubt. Id.
51.
Wilkinson, supra note 12, at 1665, 1675.
52.
BORK, supra note 27, at 151 (emphasis added).
53.
Fiss, supra note 34, at 790.
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transitive across all individuals, it is still necessary to posit that the
sources upon which the cognitive faculty of reason must act in
adjudication are definite or constraining enough to provide reason
with a clear guide for a uniform outcome. That is, the sources
themselves must be amenable to rational analysis-they must be
determinate, or the application of the cognitive faculty will be of no
avail.
This is certainly not uncontroversial: The determinacy of law
has been a source of heated debate in legal theory, but the antiempathy thinkers have no such doubts. As Kerr puts it, "[even in the
hard cases, there is usually one side that emerges as slightly stronger
than the other." 5 4 Others, like Wilkinson, have faith that traditional
tools of interpretation can facilitate the endeavor." "But even as to an
ambiguous text," he writes, "the judge must use maxims of statutory
interpretation to determine what others meant. Inclusio unius
exclusio omnes, for example, ties the hands of a judge both as to
included and omitted terms."56 Bork laments not the futility of such
an endeavor (he finds it both possible and valuable), but instead that
some "political" judges would deliberately and dishonestly refuse to
act based on the answers that "legal doctrine" provides: "[I]t is not
true that all judges choose their results and reason backward. But it is
true for some judges."" And, as he later says, "[L]aw is [not] so
indeterminate that these results can be reached without straining the
fabric of legal logic."" There is an extant fabric-the problem is
merely that some adjudicators ignore it. 9
By now, a complete picture of the positive argument of the
anti-empathic consensus has emerged. Law's function is to create
predictability, in turn making freedom and social life possible

54. Kerr, supra note 46.
55.
Wilkinson, supra note 12, at 1680.
56.
Id.
57.
BORK, supra note 27, at 70-71.
58.
Id. at 70.
59.
Id. It is unclear where Wechsler fits in here, though. He, too, has faith in
determinacy, although for him this comes not solely from the text and precedent, but
also his "principles": "[T]he relative compulsion of the language of the Constitution,
of history and precedent" can in certain cases (many?) "combine to make an answer
clear," and "where they do not," the "special values" that the Bill of Rights
provisions "embody" can step in. Wechsler, supra note 22, at 17, 19. Still, there are
limits to texts. Id at 19 ("I argue that we should prefer to see the other clauses of the
Bill of Rights read as an affirmation of the special values they embody rather than as
statements of a finite rule of law .
). Here, he somewhat departs from his cothinkers.
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simultaneously.
This
function
requires
that
the
lawmaking/executing/adjudicating body (the "State") obey certain
procedural limitations-the "rule of law"-one aspect of which
demands that adjudication result in an efficacy that is congruent with
the legal system's actually prescribed norms, and, given the
generality of these norms, it demands uniform results in like cases.
Uniform adjudication is only possible, though, if the judges are
required to derive the law from fixed sources, namely, text and
precedent. Moreover, uniformity is only possible if the interpretation
and application of those fixed sources is in turn accomplished by
some stable or predictable human faculty: reason. This keeps the
judge within the realm of "law" and not "politics." 60
C. Improper Adjudication
As its name suggests, the anti-empathic turn consists of more
than a positive argument. The flipside of the demand for cognitive
adjudication is a prohibition on the employment of affective
faculties, including empathy.
Consider what we described as the first step in adjudication:
what Bork calls the "derivation" of the legal source. 6 1 In the antiempathic argument, this is expected to be the text and its original
public meaning-something universal, something fixed.62 With
empathy, though, a new source of "law" is added: the judge's own
body of personal experiences and the conscience that is a product of
that. The problem with this is that it is neither universal nor fixed; it
is a source of law that varies according to who the judge is, and is not
shared by others with different experiences. This introduction of an
individualistic and protean legal source is seen as threatening
uniformity and predictability. Outcomes are now influenced by
judicial personality or individuality.
Kerr warns that, in hard cases, empathy introduces "whatever
normative vision of the law that the judge happens to like," and that
proponents of this method accept that "[the judge] can and should
pick the side by looking in his heart." 6 3 The "heart" becomes an
alternate source of law. Bork argues that the law "has a meaning
independent of our own desires," and that the judge may not "make
60.
BORK, supra note 27, at 146. "The Court can act as a legal rather than a
political institution only if it is neutral," he writes. Id.
61.
See id.
62.
See id.
63.
Kerr, supra note 46.
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unguided value judgments of his own"-this would be "rule by
judges according to their own desires," and not Constitutionalism.64
Bork's fears are spoken of in the language of the affective and
nonrational: Desire supplants law. Whelan speaks of more of the
same, decrying Obama's statement that the "critical ingredient" of
judging in hard cases is what's in the "judge's heart": "No clearer
prescription for lawless judicial activism is possible."65 Wechsler
agrees, writing, "the Court has been decreeing value choices in a way
that makes it quite impossible to speak of principled
determinations. "66
Wilkinson also talks in terms of the emotions as a source of
law, and not just as a faculty-emotions are creative, and creation is
nonjudicial. "[J]udges who rely on singular emotion or distinctive
experience in rendering decisions are planting the seeds of artistic
creation in terrain where they do not belong," he argues. 67 "In the
interest of empathy, evolving decency, ethnic identity, or numerous
whatevers, [judges] exhibit from the bench those striking
brushstrokes of personal vision," he writes, "[But] Judges are not
'dictators of the case,' entitled to impose judgment based on their
impressions or self-expressive concepts of what the outcome should
be." 68 Emotions are personal, and reflect only the self
Wilkinson-more than others-describes why this private
individuality of emotions is such a bad thing. First, there is the
familiar counter-majoritarian refrain: Judges are insular "elitist"
professionals who know little of the life of everyman. 69 "The
individual perspective from the bench is all too often idiosyncratic,
reflecting a particular upbringing or identity, and the democratic
process is intended to submerge precisely that."" Therefore, "to
assert that empathy, self-expression, or subjectivity" should be
employed in judicial decision-making "requires a certain chutzpah,
whether conscious or not."" Beyond this, Wilkinson seems to argue
that the authority of the judicial office is inherently anti-empathic or
anti-affective-something probably flowing from the law-politics
divide: "If a judge ... views the law as a field for artistic license,
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

BORK, supra note 27, at 143, 146, 160.
Whelan, supranote 25.
Wechsler, supranote 22, at 20.
Wilkinson, supra note 12, at 1678.
Id. at 1685.
Id. at 1678.
Id. at 1679.
Id. at 1678.
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that individual has abdicated the very power that makes him a
judge."7 2 Fiss, by the way, would agree, writing that "[q]ualifying the
judiciary's commitment to reason undermines its authority."7 3
Finally, there comes the central argument-emotions will lead
to inconsistency and non-uniformity:
[I]t is inappropriate to institutionalize the emotions of judges . . .. Law is
supposed to ... provide a stable foundation upon which society can build
new structures in accordance with democratic will . . .. Law is useless as a
stabilizing force if it varies from day to day and from judge to judge.
Judicial decision making that relies on the artistic virtues comes
74
dangerously close to negating law's distinctive reason for being ....

These are all the results of allowing adjudicators to appeal to
affective faculties; these faculties take on the aspects of a new
"source" of law, and anchoring the legal source to the individual
judge means that outcomes will not be the same for litigants across
like cases. The crucial variable becomes the judge himself.
The anti-empathic movement also believes that empathy (and
other emotions) can play a pernicious role after the "derivation"
stage-they can skew the interpretation and application. Even if the
legal source is not corrupted by an appeal to the judge's heart, the
adjudication is still illicit if that heart enters in to interpret and apply
what is otherwise a clear textual mandate. Here, the outcomes will
change based on the vagaries of the individual case-there will only
be consistency with respect to the variables that are determinative for
the judge's empathy. Thus, Sotomayor will always vote in favor of
Latinos, Scalia would always vote in favor of protecting morals
legislation, etc.-even if the legal source dictates an opposite result.
Litigants, case type, etc.: All go into what is ultimately a resultsbased adjudication.
This argument comes up most often in anti-empathic writings
as a plea for "blind justice." "To the traditional view of justice as a
blindfolded person weighing legal claims fairly on a scale, [Obama]
wants to tear the blindfold off, so the judge can rule for the party he
empathizes with most," Calabresi writes. Wilkinson echoes this:
"[T]here is an implicit understanding, classically evinced by the
image of blind justice, that judges are trusted to wield the sword of
justice dispassionately." 7 6 In reacting to Obama's call for empathy,
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 1685.
Fiss, supra note 34, at 804.
Wilkinson, supra note 12, at 1683-84.
Calabresi, supranote 21.
Wilkinson, supra note 12, at 1684-85.
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Whelan writes, "[s]o much for the judicial virtue of dispassion."
Empathy allows for application and interpretation to be influenced or
determined based on litigant status, and therefore is adjudication by
"passion." Empathic adjudication that is also dispassionate is ignored
as an impossibility or a contradiction in terms. Thus Bork collapses
empathy into sympathy: "[The Judge] must apply [the law]
consistently and without regard to his sympathy or lack of sympathy
with the parties before him," and it cannot be that "any particular
group or political position is always entitled to win. "78 Wechsler,
before all the others, decries results-based adjudication as antijudicial and rooted in unprincipled emotional79 biases. In
constructing his argument for neutral principles, he immediately
dismisses those who, "vouching no philosophy to warranty, frankly
or covertly make the test of virtue in interpretation whether its result
in the immediate decision seems to hinder or advance the interests or
the values they support."" Often this is tied to the type of litigant,
which is itself an emotional attachment:
If he may know he disapproves of a decision when all he knows is that it
has sustained a claim put forward by a labor union or a taxpayer, a Negro
or a segregationist, a corporation or a Communist-he acquiesces in the
proposition that a man of different sympathy but equal information may no
less properly conclude that he approves.

If this is allowed, though, adjudicators are not courts of law, but are
"naked power organ[s]."8 2
The anti-empathic thinkers do not do so well at explicating
precisely why this type of "ad hoc"8 3 adjudication is antithetical to
the proper role of a court of law; they think it obvious. What must be
implied is our familiar consistency or uniformity demand of the rule
of law. Recall Wilkinson's plea: "Law is useless as a stabilizing
force if it varies from day to day and from judge to judge."84
This central critique of empathic judging-at the derivation,
interpretation, and application stages-like the anti-empathic
thinkers' positive argument, relies on certain implicit assumptions.
For one, it must be assumed that the "traditional" or textual legal
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Whelan, supranote 25.
BORK, supra note 27, at 151, 146.
The cause might also be ideological attachment.
Wechsler, supranote 22, at 11.
Id at 12 (emphasis added).
Id
See id
Wilkinson, supra note 12, at 1684.
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source must not itself explicitly call for empathy-like adjudication. If
a statute clearly commanded that it be interpreted and applied
according to a judge's "sound discretion" or "in the interests of
justice," say, then it would be hard to argue that the rule of law is
subverted by particularistic, empathic adjudication in that instance.
More importantly, though, just as the positive argument for
rational adjudication depends upon what we called the "transitive"
quality of reason (it is possessed by all judges and produces like
results in like cases), so too does the critique necessitate a nontransitive understanding of empathy and affective faculties. It is
assumed that empathy will not create like results in like cases when
employed by different judges, probably because of the diversity of
experiences that the individual judges will have. Thus, Fiss strongly
criticizes the particularistic bent of the affective faculties: "Often, but
not always, our passions seem directed toward, or attached to,
particulars . . . . [Passion] invites a certain partisanship . . . to favor
one individual or another for purely arbitrary reasons."" He also
thinks that the affective faculties have dark sides-another problem
that is not shared by rationality: "[J]udges are complicated human
beings who harbor not only feelings of sympathy, but also feelings of
fear, contempt and even hate" and an "acknowledgment of the
multiplicity of passions" means recognition of the fact that "while
some passions are good, others are quite bad."8 6 All this is of course
problematic, as a court "must concern itself with the fate of millions
of people."" A court's perspective "must be systematic, not
anecdotal.""
D. Conclusion
In sum, the anti-empathic turn combines both a positive
depiction of appropriate adjudication and a critique of emotional,
empathic influences in the same process. If any affective faculties are
allowed to enter in, this makes the adjudicator's "heart" a new source
from which law is derived. This brings in unauthorized,
democratically illegitimate, and particularistic-often elitistconsiderations into law, which ought to be common and generally
85.
Fiss, supra note 34, at 799, 801.
86.
Id. at 800. Of course, the pro-empathy thinkers do not advocate any and
all emotive responses; Fiss's concern does go to the larger fear of the anti-empaths,
though, that emotions cannot be controlled no matter what their nature.
87.
Id. at 802.
88.
Id. at 803.
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shared. Of course, this also brings in a potential for inconsistency,
given that judges' experiences and affects will be different.
Moreover, even in cases where the legal source is unambiguously
textual or traditional, injecting empathy into the methodology of the
interpretation and application of that source will still be problematic.
Here, the particularities of the case, whether they be the nature of the
issue or of the litigants, will appeal to the judge's emotional
attachments and lead to results-based adjudication. Again, nonuniformity looms over the endeavor. The congruence feature of the
rule of law is thus undermined by empathic adjudication, as like
cases will not have similar outcomes-at least not from the point of
view of the legal system as a whole. Ultimately, this impairs the very
raison d'dtre of law itself, which is to create a stable and predictable
landscape for social living.
The crux of the anti-empathic consensus, then, seems to be the
non-transitivity of affects: All empathy is "selective empathy." The
affective capacities are categorically incapable of providing a
uniform or consistent manner of ascertaining legal meaning, and of
applying it to real life. Because of this, empathic adjudication
inevitably destabilizes the rule of law by defeating uniformity.
The non-transitivity of affects, though, is also juxtaposed
alongside the observation that affective faculties often have a certain
bias or tilt. This explains why much of anti-empathic thinking
emphasizes that adjudication incorporating empathy will be
inherently skewed towards weaker parties. Calabresi attributes the
following to Obama: "Empathy, not justice, ought to be the mission
of the federal courts, and the redistribution of wealth should be their
mantra.""' He believes that Obama wants judges "to decide cases in
light of the empathy they ought to feel for the little guy in any
lawsuit.""o Bork, quoting a famous law professor, encapsulates the
purported motto of the Warren court pithily: "[T]he less favored in
life will be the more favored in law.""
Thus, empathy is inherently political in its selectivity and
variability: It simply chooses a resultant outcome based on value
choices and instrumentalizes the principles to achieve this result.
Kerr writes that "emphasizing the need for 'empathy' is an invitation
to replace law with politics," and Whelan criticizes Obama's
philosophy as abandoning "a craft of judging that is distinct from
89.
90.
91.

Calabresi, supranote 21.
Id.
BORK, supra note 27, at 70 (citation omitted).
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politics."9 2 As is often the case, those who disagree with this claim
restate it most clearly and succinctly:
First, empathy is a species of passion or emotion; it is subjective, variable,
impervious to evaluation, and too unreliable to be permitted to intrude into
judicial decision-making. Second, empathy is a quality that singles out the
powerless and disenfranchised, and is therefore inconsistent with the
norms of blind, evenhanded justice, which prohibit the singling out of
particular groups.93

Or, as Nussbaum summarizes, "[t]he calculating intellect
claims to be impartial and capable of strict numerical justice, while
emotions, it alleges, are prejudiced, unduly partial to the close at
hand."94 At bottom, then, the anti-empathic argument rests on two
psychological claims: The affective faculties are (1) non-transitive
and (2) biased.
IV. CLASSICAL LEGAL ORTHODOXY

The anti-empathic consensus is embedded in the contemporary
intellectual landscape-but where did it come from? As with any
theory or system of thought, its creation is surely not ex nihilo, and it
is useful and enlightening to inquire into how similar to or different
it may be from theories that precede it. The thesis of this Article is
that the anti-empathic turn is a descendant of Langdellian
orthodoxy-what some today call "Formalism." Before a complete
comparison can be made, the presentation of the progeny must be
supplemented by that of its progenitor. However, because the earlier
theory has been discussed and written about exhaustively for almost
a century, its description will be far shorter than that of the somewhat
new anti-empathic movement.
The following Part will describe the central features of
Langdellianism-what we will call "classical legal orthodoxy." I say
"ism," as this theory will admittedly be an amalgamation, and
92.
Kerr, supra note 46; Whelan, supra note 25. Some anti-empathic
thinkers are more nuanced and accept the realist thesis that emotions will play a role
in adjudication, but that they ought not to. See Fiss, supra note 34, at 797.
93.
Bandes, Moral Imagination in Judging, supra note 8, at 8.

94. MARTHA
AND PUBLIC LIFE 67

C. NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE: THE LITERARY IMAGINATION
(1995); see also id. at 57-58 ("But people in the grip of

emotions, because they place important elements of their good outside themselves,
will change with the gusts of fortune and are just as little to be relied upon as the
world itself is. . . . [T]hey lack the stability and solidity of the wise person....
Emotions, this objector charges, focus on the person's actual ties or attachments,
especially to concrete objects or people close to the self.").
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perhaps even somewhat of a departure from how Langdell himself
actually understood law. We are interested not so much in creating
an accurate intellectual history as in sketching out the generally
accepted picture of that period. After all, it cannot be Langdell, but
only Langdellianism that is at work in contemporary times-and this
incorporates not merely Langdell's own thoughts, but also the gloss
put on them by both his disciples and his critics over many years.
Even caricatures have influence.
The central idea of classical legal orthodoxy, of this "ism," is
that law is a science. The rest of this Part will be an explication of
that one proposition.
A. Background and Law as Science
Classical legal orthodoxy is most associated with its primary
founder: C.C. Langdell.'" Langdell was Dean of Harvard Law School
for many decades (starting in 1870), and his tenure there allowed
him to have a lasting impact on both legal education and legal
theory.9 6 He brought the "case method" of teaching law into vogue,
and aimed to create a science of law by bringing law schools back
into the fold of modem research universities. Because of his
influence, he has come to represent the entire era of legal orthodoxy:
The Legal Realists would focus their attacks on him, and he "has
long been taken as a symbol of the [orthodox] age.""
As said above, classical legal orthodoxy understands law to be
a science. "Law, considered as a science," Langdell famously writes,
"consists of certain principles or doctrines. To have such a mastery
of these as to be able to apply them with constant facility and
certainty to the ever-tangled skein of human affairs, is what
constitutes a true lawyer."" The idea of law as science is "the heart"
of classical legal orthodoxy, and "Langdell believed that through
scientific methods lawyers could derive correct legal judgments from
a few fundamental principles and concepts, which it was the task of

95.
96.

GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 42 (1977).

97.

ANTHONY

Id.

T.

KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE

LEGAL PROFESSION 168-70 (1993).
98.
GILMORE, supra note 95, at 42 ("A better symbol could hardly be found;
if Langdell had not existed, we would have had to invent him.").

99. C.C. LANGDELL, A
viii (2d ed. 1879).

SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, at
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the scholar-scientist like himself to discover."' The creation of this
idea took place during a time of larger debates about the meaning
and importance of science to society more generally.' This science
was not purely theoretical, like mathematics or logic, but was not
purely empirical, either, as with biology. 0 2 To understand this, we
must discuss each step of the "scientific" endeavor in turn.
B. Induction
Classical legal orthodoxy begins its "scientific" method by
inducing higher-order concepts from "empirical" phenomena:
reported common law cases. 0 3 As Langdell writes, "[the Law] is to
be traced in the main through a series of cases; and much the shortest
and best, if not the only way of mastering the doctrine effectually is
by studying the cases in which it is embodied."'0 4 Thus, he spoke
with conviction when identifying the "laboratories . . . [of] the
chemists and physicists" with "the library" of the law students and

100. Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 5 (1983).
101.
Howard Schweber, The "Science" of Legal Science: The Model of the
NaturalSciences in Nineteenth-CenturyAmerican Legal Education, 17 LAw & HIST.
REV. 421, 457 (1999) ("Thus when Langdell looked for inspiration to natural
science, he was presented with two competing models. One, the remnants of the
system of Protestant Baconianism, claimed relevance for all areas of human study
and reflected the thinking that had prevailed when Langdell received his education.
The other, the specialized science of Asa Gray, took place within a closed
community that had little to say to outsiders. It is by no means obvious, though, that
the 'science' in Langdell's legal science was drawn from one side or the other in the
divide between old and new ways of thinking, nor that it might not embody elements

of both.").
102. See Catharine Pierce Wells, Langdell and the Invention of Legal
Doctrine, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 551, 594-95 (2010); see also KRONMAN, supra note 97,
at 170-71.
103. Grey, supra note 100, at 19, 20; see also THOMAS C. GREY, FORMALISM
AND PRAGMATISM IN AMERICAN LAw 65 (2014) ("For them, the fundamental
principles of the common law were discerned by induction from cases . . . .");
Edward Rubin, What's Wrong with Langdell's Method, and What to Do About It, 60
VAND. L. REV. 609, 632-33 (2007) ("Thus, a second aspect of the legal science was
that it was empirical; as Anthony Sebok points out, legal principles were to be
discerned by inductive, not deductive reasoning."); Schweber, supra note 101, at
458 ("In fact, Langdell's method was analogous to an experimental method, but it
was the method that looked to the taxonomical characterization of natural objects,
not that of Gray's theoretical science. Cases, in Arthur Sutherland's words, were
'specimens' for classification.").
104. LANGDELL, supra note 99, at vi.
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materials of that science are contained in printed books."'06
This is a strange view of empirical study, though, as Langdell
thinks that the legal scholar need not induce from all relevant datarather, he should cherry pick the "exceedingly small" number of
"useful and necessary" cases, as the "vast majority [of cases] are
useless and worse than useless for any purpose of systematic
study."o' For this reason, some scholars doubt that the method of
classical legal orthodoxy is "empirical" at all." As Gilmore remarks,
"the Langdellians . . . performed major surgery on [the law]," and

"[t]he lack of correspondence between the explicit holdings of
judicial decisions and the 'real rules' that in his view justified the
results in those cases was one of the most remarkable features of
Langdell's doctrinal writing." 0 9 For our purposes, it is simply worth
noting that there is at least some empiricism, in that the higher order
concepts and rules are not merely abstracted from the minds of the
theorizer.
It is also worth noting that there is a negative implication in
Langdell's statements: Only precedential legal sources may be
consulted in discerning what the law is, and anything else is
irrelevant. For example, in criticizing the "mailbox rule" from
contract law, Langdell admits that it advances "the purposes of
substantial justice, and the interests of contracting parties as
understood by themselves," but concludes that these considerations
are "irrelevant."" 0 This can be called the autonomy of legal
reasoning-it admits of no supplementation.
C. Concepts and Rules, and Their Properties
The expected result of the inductive process is the discovery or
ascertainment of general legal concepts. As quoted above, Langdell
describes the science of law as "consist[ing] of certain principles or
105.
Christopher Langdell, Harvard Celebration Speeches, 3 LAW Q. REV.
123, 124 (1887).
106.
Id.
107. LANGDELL, supra note 99, at vi.
108.
Dennis Patterson, Langdell's Legacy, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 196, 198-99
(1995) (doubting that the method can be called "experimental" if the doctrine trumps
the cases); Wells, supra note 102, at 594 (disagreeing with this characterization
because Langdell wanted a freestanding theory).
109.
GILMORE, supra note 95, at 48; Grey, supra note 100, at 11 n.35.
110.
C.C. LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 20-21 (2d ed.
1880).
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doctrines" and notes that there are a finite and discernable number of
"fundamental legal doctrines."" An example of a "concept" or a
"doctrine" is that of consideration in contract law. Importantly, the
law contains doctrines and not their justifications (say, efficiency or
fairness)."1 2 After the concepts are derived, these then produce lowerorder "rules" to be applied in actual cases." 3 Thus, the concept of
consideration in contracts leads to the demand for actual
communication between the parties, thereby foreclosing the validity
of the mailbox rule.114
Implicit in classical legal orthodoxy is that the concepts of the
law have an order to them. Professor Grey describes this well: "A
legal system is conceptually ordered . . . [when] a small number of
relatively abstract principles and concepts . . . form a coherent

system.""' Beyond this, the concepts must cover all potential fact
patterns-the conceptual order must be complete, providing "a
uniquely correct solution-a 'right answer'-for every case that can
arise under it.""

6

Gilmore puts it eloquently: The Langdellians

sought to "reduce an unruly diversity to a manageable unity.""'
Classical legal orthodoxy thus aspired to both conceptual order and
completeness."'
D. Deduction
Once the legal scientist has completed the "upward" movement
of induction, the next process similarly mimics natural science"downward" deductive application of the rules to actual cases, using
the tools of logic and reason."' Scholars now call this a "formal"
111.
LANGDELL, supra note 99, at viii.
112. Wells, supra note 102, at 553. Langdell invented "the modern notion of
legal doctrine." Id.
113.
See id.
114.
Grey, supra note 100, at 12. "[R]ules of law were then derived from
principles conceptually .... " Id at 19.
115.
Id. at 8.
116.
Id. at 7.
117.
GILMORE, supra note 95, at 43.
118.
This meant that there were "[a] few basic top-level categories and
principles form[ing] a conceptually ordered system above a large number of bottomlevel rules." Grey, supra note 100, at 11.
119.
For the classical legal orthodox thinkers, "[tihe system was doubly
formal. First, the specific rules were framed in such terms that decisions followed
from them uncontroversially when they were applied to readily ascertainable facts
. . . . Second, at the next level up one could derive the rules themselves analytically
from the principles." Id at 11-12; see also Richard H. Pildes, Forms of Formalism,
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method: "A legal system is formal to the extent that its outcomes are
dictated by demonstrative (rationally compelling) reasoning. "120
Describing Langdellianism, Anthony Kronman writes, "[o]nce the
basic premises of a particular branch of law have been established,
the remaining task is one of ratiocination only."121 This, of course,
means that anyone with reason and logic could do it, without any
experience to draw upon: "[C]learheadedness is essential and much
time and patience are required, but experience is equally
irrelevant."1 2 2 The eminent legal historian Morton Horwitz writes that
this was an "intellectual system which gave common law rules the
appearance of being self-contained, apolitical, and inexorable."1 23
Faith in this methodology led Holmes to retort (in his famous
critique of Langdell), "The life of the law has not been logic: it has
been experience."1 2 4
E. Implications
The scientific method of law has certain concrete upshots for
adjudication. The first is determinacy, which flows from the
conceptual completeness and formalism of the method: If the limited
number of legal concepts logically produce rules that in turn
logically apply to all conceivable sets of facts, then there will be no
hard cases. Every outcome will be dictated from the very beginning:
"[L]aw meant . . . a scientific system of rules and institutions that
were complete in that the system made right answers available in all
cases; formal in that right answers could be derived from the
autonomous, logical working out of the system."1 25 Thus arises the
caricature
of
Langdellian
orthodoxy
as
"mechanical
26
jurisprudence,"1
and more modern critiques describing it as

66 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 608 (1999) ("Rules for specific cases were then to be the
autonomous, worked-out logical entailments of those fundamental principles.").
120.
Grey, supranote 100, at 8.
121. KRONMAN, supra note 97, at 173.
122. Id. at 173-74.
123.
Morton J. Horwitz, The Rise ofLegal Formalism, 19 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
251, 252 (1975).
124. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Book Notices, 14 AM. L. REV. 233, 234 (1880)

(reviewing C.C.

LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS,
WITH A SUMMARY OF THE Topics COVERED BY THE CASES (1879)).

125.
Pildes, supranote 119, at 608.
126.
See generally Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L.
REV. 605, 610 (1908).
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"inexorable" or "inevitab[le]."1 27 As Grey writes, this is the "promise
of universal formality-'every case an easy case.' The legal system
was to be so arranged that it resolved hard disputes by indubitable
(even if complex) reasoning."128 Even in cases of first impression, the
methodology is not stymied: These cases merely call for the
application of the same deduction to classify the case and infer an
appropriate rule. "When a new case arose to which no existing rule
applied," Grey notes, "it could be categorized and the correct rule for
it could be inferred by use of the general concepts and principles; the
rule could then be applied to the facts to dictate the unique correct
decision in the case."1 2 9
The flipside of this determinacy results in the second major
implication of classical legal orthodoxy: Cases can be objectively
wrong. Judges who reason incorrectly or who are too dimwitted to
follow the logic to its conclusion will produce results at odds with
the "real" law. Recall Langdell's assertion that "[t]he vast majority
[of cases] are useless and worse than useless for any purpose of
systematic study."'30 It is the legal scholar's concepts that are the
"real" law, and cases either hit or miss that mark. As Grant Gilmore
writes, "[t]he doctrine tests the cases, not the other way around." 3
Other implications of the scientific method of classical legal
orthodoxy are supra-legal. First, it is presumed that such an
adjudicative theory insulates judging and law from "politics"; by
anchoring law in pure conceptual order and rational deduction, it is
separated from the melee of political conflict entirely and is imbued
with legitimacy and authority. As Grey writes, "the classical
scientists drew a sharp line between neutral law and partisan politics,
placing the fundamentals and many of the details of the market and
private property system on the legal rather than the political side of
the line."1 3 2 Reason provided its own legitimization of judicial
authority-reason was objective and apolitical, and "[b]y denying

.

127.
Horwitz, supra note 123, at 252.
128.
Grey, supranote 100, at 32.
129.
Id. at 11; see also KRONMAN, supranote 97, at 174 ("Thus even in cases
of first impression, Langdell's method offers a procedure for determining what the
law is and hence how the case should be decided. .
130. LANGDELL, supra note 99, at vi.
131.
GILMORE, supra note 95, at 47; see also KRONMAN, supra note 97, at
182; Patterson, supra note 108, at 201 ("Correct legal principles are discovered not
in the plethora of decided cases, but in the realm of (ideal) theory. Cases are
illustrative, not instructive. Cases stand in need of explanation. Doctrineexplanatory principles-is the (hidden) true legal order.").
132.
Grey, supranote 100, at 35.
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the status of law to any decision that could not be independently
derived by reason alone, Langdell limited the authority of what is
actual in the law to what is rational in it."'33 Horwitz too notes that
scientific legal orthodoxy had this legitimizing effect, but attributes it
to pro-capitalist motivations: "[T]he paramount social condition that
is necessary for legal formalism to flourish in a society is for the
powerful groups in that society to have a great interest in disguising
and suppressing the inevitably political and redistributive functions
of law."1 3 4 Professor Rubin sees Langdell's "mythology" as attractive
to its climate of opinion because, in the absence of a divine or natural
law sanction behind adjudication, the common law could take on this
objective and transcendent justificatory role.'35 Reason had these
properties; one does not need a god if a rational judge is a sufficient
replacement.
A second supra-legal implication of the scientific method is its
expected stabilizing effect of the legal system, in turn allowing for
more personal freedom. Langdellianism's appeal, Grey writes, was
that "[t]he system would be predictable; people could know in which
circumstances they would get the aid and in which they would face
the opposition of state power. Further, people would be free from
public force exerted for the arbitrary personal ends of its
guardians."' 36 He, like Horwitz, also notes the especial affinity that
commercial interests have for these values-a fact emphasized by
the Legal Realists' later critiques.13

133.

KRONMAN, supra note 97, at 182.
134. Horwitz, supra note 123, at 264; see also id at 255 ("The new and
defensive emphasis in orthodox legal theory on the 'scientific' nature of the law
arose simultaneously as a reaction to the claim of the radical codifiers that the
common law was political.").
135.
Rubin, supra note 103, at 623-24 ("Apart from its philosophical appeal,
this belief about the common law served the important purpose of political
justification. Why should judges possess the authority to articulate legal rules that
the legislature has not enacted? ... [T]he justification was that underlying principles
were the essence of the common law, and, that common law judges, in reaching
their decisions, derived both their authority and their decisional constraints from the
principles themselves. . . . Common law was thus regarded as containing embedded
principles reflecting the inherited wisdom of a nation's legal culture.").
136.
Grey, supra note 100, at 32.
137.
Id at 33.
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F. Limits
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One final qualification of classical orthodoxy is required: It
envisions itself as only applicable in the realm of judge-made,
private law. As Rubin writes, "Langdell believed that the only real
law-the only law that merited study as a science-was common
law."'3 8 Public law adjudication is really statutory interpretation, and
is therefore not amenable to induction of concepts. Statutes are but
the ad hoc emanations of the legislative body, subject to all of its
whims and caprices, and bearing no factual pattern for analysis nor
any opinion rationalizing its mandates. "The legal scientists," Grey
states, "were . . . not much attracted to the problems of statutory
interpretation; they believed that the haphazard law laid down in the
statute books did not lend itself to conceptual ordering."'3 9 One
famous Langdellian, Joseph Henry Beale, laments that the
"haphazard legislation by a legislature [is] chosen not primarily for
wisdom . . . [and] is not wise enough to foresee its effects other than
the particular injustice in mind."'4 0 More to the point, Langdell
himself simply states that "law" and "legislation" are not
coterminous.1 4
Constitutional law is especially resistant to the scientific
approach, given its broad language and vague commands. Thus,
prominent Langdellians resisted the creation of the University of
Chicago Law School, which had proposed to teach public law as a
major component of the curriculum. 4 2 As Grey summarizes,
Constitutional law was unscientific, because hopelessly vague, as typified
by the police power doctrine; the question whether a statute was
138.
Rubin, supranote 103, at 633.
139.
Grey, supra note 100, at 34; see id. at 34-35 ("When they did confront
statutory problems they did not tend to rely on the canon about statutes in derogation
of the common law. Their formalism rather pointed them toward literal readings that
avoided both narrowing and expansive purposive interpretation.").
140. Notes by Robert Lee Halefrom JurisprudenceLectures Given by Joseph
Henry Beale, HarvardLaw School, 1909, 29 U. MIAMi L. REV. 281, 300-01 (1975).
141. C.C. Langdell, Dominant Opinions in England During the Nineteenth
Century in Relation to Legislation as Illustrated by English Legislation, or the
Absence oflt, During That Period, 19 HARV. L. REV. 151, 151 (1906).
142.
Grey, supra note 100, at 34 ("The classicists did not regard public law,
including constitutional law, as amendable to scientific study at all. Thus, Langdell's
Harvard colleagues and disciples Beale and Ames threatened to withdraw their offer
to help the new University of Chicago Law School get started, because its organizers
proposed to teach a substantial number of public law courses, thus violating the
Harvard curricular dogma that students must be exposed only to scientific 'pure law'
courses.").

Modern CritiquesofJudicialEmpathy

845

"reasonably related to safety, health or morals" could not be treated
formally. To the legal science mentality such open-ended questions were
political, not legal, and the courts abandoned any scientific role in trying
to answer them.1 4 3

Either vagueness or incoherence in a law or legal code makes it
an intractable subject for classical legal analysis-it makes the task
of adjudication simply another iteration of the typical political back
and forth. As Grey writes, Langdellians saw public law "as the
peripheral and anomalous hybrid of law and politics."'" Without
conceptual order that is amenable to formal deduction, legal science
is a fool's errand-or so the classical legal thinkers believed.
G. Summary

Classical legal orthodoxy begins with the central notion that
law is science. This means that quasi-empirical analysis leads to
induction of core concepts (themselves coherently ordered and
covering the complete universe of possible scenarios), which in turn
produce lower level rules through deduction. These rules are then
applied to actual cases, and produce a "correct" outcome every time.
Induction, deduction, and application are formal: Only logic and
reason are employed, and these dictate the result autonomously (no
non-legal sources are needed). This method is expected to result in a
law that is determinate-outcomes are constrained and pre-ordained
by reason, and this determinacy enables "law" to be separate from
"politics," which in turn ensures the legitimacy of the judiciary and
the preservation of the rule of law. All this, it is hoped, results in
greater personal freedom in that it creates a stable framework for
social living. Finally, because such a theory of adjudication requires
that it act upon legal sources that are themselves conceptually
ordered, it cannot work in the area of public law, where sources are
nothing more than the ad hoc emanations of a legislature.
V. ANTI-EMPATHIC TURN AS NEO-ORTHODOXY

Having completed a survey of both the anti-empathic turn and
classical legal orthodoxy, their substantial similarities seem striking.
Overall, this reaction to judicial empathy in the 2000s can and should
be seen as the intellectual descendant of the mode of thinking that

143.
144.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id at 48.
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dominated Harvard around 1900-except for the expected area of
application.
A. Comparison
First, both the anti-empathic turn and classical legal orthodoxy
seem to agree on the deeper justifications of their adjudicative
methods: The function of law is to engender stability and
predictability so that social living and liberty might coexist in a
complex polity, and the process limitations of the "rule of law" are
essential to this aspiration. Recall Wilkinson's discussion of law as a
"roadmap" and a stabilizing force, along with the frequent
invocations of the rule of law in anti-empathic writings. 4 5 These can
be juxtaposed alongside the goals (whether they be cover for ulterior
motivations or not) of classical legal orthodoxy: The new industrial
economy needed predictability, but so too do all societies.
Next, both intellectual movements insist that for the rule of law
to create its desired effects, "law" must be hermetically sealed from
"politics." The anti-empathic thinkers lament the rise of "activist" or
"political" judging, and believe that only "neutral," purely rational
adjudication can preserve space for a robust democracy: The
counter-majoritarian difficulty is thus solved by rationalism.
Separation is also needed to protect the rational, neutral law from the
value conflicts of politics-the dual isolation is mutually beneficial,
necessary for the survival of each. Similarly, classical legal thinkers
endeavored to prove that law could be "scientific" and apolitical;
their method would be so determinate and autonomous that no one
could challenge the correctness of the outcomes. The anti-empathic
writers decried "political" judging, while Langdell argued that
"justice" was irrelevant to adjudication. For both, neutral,
"scientific" judging grants legitimacy and authority to the judiciary.
The anti-empathic consensus and classical legal orthodoxy also
substantially agree with respect to the manner in which the
"derivation" of the legal source must take place. Both posit that only
traditional legal sources may provide the start and end points for
legal reasoning (legal reasoning is autonomous). Thus, Bork
emphasizes the text of the law and its original meaning, while the
orthodox thinkers look solely to the isolated world of common law
precedent. Both theories also seem to think that this relevant universe
of legal sources can provide answers for any case that might arise145.

Wilkinson, supra note 12, at 1683.
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law has completeness. Kerr writes that the solution to hard cases is to
read the briefs again and think some more, while the Langdellians
thought that their induced concepts could cover any possible set of
facts that might arise.
For both the anti-empathic thinkers and classical legal
orthodoxy, the law that is derived in such a manner is then
interpreted and applied formally: Pure logic and rationality dictate
the process and outcomes. This is perhaps their strongest similarity.
Reason and logic apply the rules to cases, and the result will be the
same in like circumstances so long as the methodology is accurately
employed.
Fiss
demands
"intellectual
integrity"
through
"rationalism," 146 while, as Kronman articulates, the orthodox thinkers
expected to employ "ratiocination only."1 4 7 Bork and Wechsler
demand "neutral" application of principles, no matter the result,
while Langdell attacks the mailbox rule despite its substantive justice
because justice is "irrelevant"-both mean that cold reason should
determine application and interpretation.1 48 Of course, empathy or
any other affective faculty is totally out of place in the endeavor.
Many of the implications of each theory of adjudication are
also points of similarity. For example, both believe in the near
absolute determinacy of the law. Kerr thinks that a "50/50" case will
be vanishingly rare, and Langdell would deny the possibility at all.
Determinacy leads to another implication that is shared by both: the
objective correctness (or not) of case outcomes. Langdellians
dismissed the "vast majority" of the contracts cases as wrong, while
Bork and Wechsler lamented "unprincipled" adjudication in Brown
and Shelley-all of these are simply wrong, and even consistent high
court holdings on an issue do not settle it as correctly "the law" (say,
the mailbox rule for Langdell, or affirmative action for Bork).
In sum, the central lineaments of both the anti-empathic turn
and classical legal orthodoxy are substantially similar, and the antiempathic turn can be accurately described as neo-orthodox legal
thought. Thus, West's diagnosis of the roots of the anti-empathic
consensus requires supplementation. While she sees one "signpost
along the way"1 49 as Legal Realism-especially the Holmesian
aspiration of adjudication guided by modem social science-it may
be fruitful to also think of the anti-empathic turn as a modem species

146.

147.
148.
149.

See Fiss, supra note 34, at 790.
See KRONMAN, supra note 97, at 173.
See BORK, supranote 27, at 146; Wechsler, supra note 22, at 16.
West, supra note 2, at 277.
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of precisely that which Legal Realism opposed: classical legal
orthodoxy.' Legal Realists argued that the indeterminacy and
incompleteness of judicial precedent meant that objective
adjudication could only be based on some external "science," and
thus they turned to the methods of the social sciences, and today,
economics.' They sought to replace what they saw as fraudulent
"legal science" with actual science. I agree that modem antiempathic thinkers hearken back to an adjudicative "scientism," but I
find that their "science" seems far more like that of Langdell than
that of Holmes, Llewellyn, or Posner.15 2
B. Contrast, Implications
One major consideration makes the anti-empathic thinkers
seem like neither Realists nor Langdellians, though: their obsession
with public law, especially constitutional law. Think of the central
battlegrounds (and birthplaces) of the anti-empathic consensus-they
were the confirmation hearings of Supreme Court justices,
specifically discussing constitutional interpretation. Moreover, Fiss,
Bork, Wechsler, Whelan, and Calabresi all seem exclusively
concerned with constitutional adjudication. Recall, though, that the
classical legal thinkers wanted nothing to do with this area of law;
the vague and general standards left too much room for judicial
150.
For West's genealogy, see id. at 274 ("A fill history of the emergent
paradigm of scientific judging is obviously beyond the scope of this discussion, but
it's worth identifying just three of the 'signposts along the road' originating either in
law or sister disciplines. The first was a development in American legal theory ...
In the first three decades of the past century, 'legal realists' famously rebelled
against the then-traditional paradigm of moralistic judging, as well as the 'brooding
omnipresence in the sky' that informed it, by which they meant the common law in
general, and Langdellian pretenses of the common law's autonomy and
'completeness' in particular.").
151.
Id. at 275. ("If the common law is not only unduly protective of capital
but also incomplete and at best an indeterminate guide for decision making in any
event, then what? To what should courts, judges, and lawyers turn when filling the
interstitial gaps in the law, if not from general principles drawn from prior cases?
First Holmes and then the realists had an imperfect answer to that question, but they
did have an answer: judges should turn to the then-nascent social sciences. The
lawyer and judge of the future, again, would be the man of the slide rule and
economics, not the man of Blackstone, precedent, and the past.").
152.
Of course, this is not to say that the new movement does not have
elements of both of these prior theories, or that these prior theories were
diametrically opposed in every respect, as they were clearly not. The history of ideas
and their development is unlikely to preserve something entirely, nor likely to recreate exact replicas.
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invention, and smacked more of politics than of "scientific" law. The
same is mostly true of the modem "law and economics" movement
West highlights-these scholars and judges rarely aspire to extend
their analysis beyond the realms of contract, property, and tort
(traditional private law subjects), and leave the constitutional lawyers
to their own devices.
This ties in to a more minor point of contrast: The newer
thinkers do not cherry-pick cases in the same strange way that
Langdell does, nor is it clear that they believe that law has
conceptual order in the same rigorous and uniform way. They
probably believe in higher level "concepts" (say, Wechsler's "neutral
principles," or the idea of "separation of powers"), but they might be
speaking only at the level of "rules," and these may or may not have
coherence with other concepts or rules. This is an important
difference, and, after all, how could they demand or expect
conceptual order given what was just mentioned-their area of
interest is public law.
Because of these differences, while West's juxtaposition of
Realism, Law & Economics, and the anti-empathic turn seems
incomplete, so too does our own comparison with classical legal
orthodoxy. The anti-empathic turn is essentially a neo-orthodox
movement, but it has transplanted that thought from its expected
field of application into another one entirely-and one that its
originators avoided not lazily, but deliberately. The anti-empathic
turn is public law Langdellianism: something that surely would have
scandalized the man himself as a contradiction in terms. The source
of public law (the legislature or the people, and not the judiciary)
makes it either too haphazard and incoherent, or too vague, to admit
of formal conceptual order. Thus, public law cannot be determinate,
and no right or wrong legal answers will flow from a neutral or
scientific rationalism. With all of this lost, this type of "adjudication"
(if it can be called that at all) is but another form of politics-no
necessary right and wrong, just winners and losers. Thus, while the
anti-empathic thinkers strenuously insist on a separation of law and
politics, legal science-as understood on its own terms-cannot
preserve the law and politics divide when applied to the area of most
interest to them: public law. The anti-empathic consensus demands
logical-formal reasoning (like classical legal orthodoxy), but unlike
its progenitor the new theory allows for this reasoning to act upon a
"law" that has no conceptual order (something orthodoxy would
have thought was a necessary first principle).
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The task of this Article was a historical one, and therefore I go
no further in assessing the possibility or coherence of the antiempathic project. John Hasnas writes, "[a]ttributing a naive legal
formalism to the opponents of judicial empathy and then proceeding
to demonstrate that legal formalism is untenable tells us nothing
about the desirability ofjudicial empathy."1 53 This is true, but modem
critics of judicial empathy should be aware of the intellectual history
of their theory, and should explain further how their theory can
synthesize Langdellianism with the adjudication of public law cases.
CONCLUSION

The public, politicians, and judges have aligned in opposition
to judicial empathy. This "anti-empathic turn" has deep intellectual
roots, and the excavation of those roots is a worthwhile task. While
some scholars understand the anti-empathy position to be the
descendant of law and economics, and ultimately Holmesian realism,
an earlier theory can better explain the source of the current
consensus. This is classical legal orthodoxy. Both classical legal
orthodoxy and modem critics of judicial empathy see the ultimate
function of adjudication to be the preservation of the "rule of law,"
and accordingly demand a sharp separation of "law" and "politics."
Legal sources must be derived, interpreted, and applied employing
reason and logic alone, and therefore the emotive faculty of empathy
has no place. For both theories, this adjudicative "science" is
expected to provide determinacy, and there should never be a hard
case. Still, the anti-empathy position and classical legal orthodoxy
differ in one major respect: The latter never expected its "scientific"
method to be applied to public law (indeed, they saw this as not
"law" at all), while the former almost exclusively focuses on this
area (normally constitutional law).
The anti-empathic consensus, then, is a product of classical
legal orthodoxy but also a mutation-one that the older theory would
not have approved. The new consensus takes the formalistic method
of its progenitor, but, unlike that older theory, does not demand that
the body of law upon which the method acts be conceptual ordered.
Given that this debate is likely to resurface very soon in the
impending confirmation hearings of any new Supreme Court justice,
153.
John Hasnas, Is Moral Imagination the Cure for Misapplied Judicial
Empathy? Bandes, Bastiat, and the Quest for Justice, 51 WASHBURN L.J. 25, 35
(2011).
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we would do well to think of the intellectual pedigree of each
position, taking note of weaknesses long recognized in older
theories, thereby approaching any categorical approval or
disapproval with the requisite awareness. To understand the debate,
we should understand its context.
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